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A STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

LIEUTENANT COLONEL PETER F. WITTERIED, USA

and propriety of that policy, despite a
continuous lack of consensus on how
containment could or should be achieved.
Probably the best definitions of deterrence
and defense are the formulations of Glenn H.
Snyder: 1

(What was the genesis of the strategy o f
Flexible Response? To what extent was
the underlying theory of Flexible
Response adhered to after the strategy
was adopted in the early 1960s? Is the
strategy still valid?)

Essentially deterrence means discouraging
the enemy from taking military action by
posing for him a prospect of cost and risk
outweighing his prospective gain. Defense
means reducing our own perspective costs
and risks in the event that deterrence
fails. Deterrence works on the enemy's
intentions; the deterrent value of military
forces is their effect in reducing the
likelihood of enemy military moves.
Defense reduces the enemy's capability to
damage or deprive us; the defense value
of military forces is their effect in
mitigating the adverse consequences for
us of possible enemy moves, whether
such consequences are counted as losses
of territory or war damage.2

INTRODUCTION

T h e r e a r e four critically important
elements which enter into the formulation of
US strategy in the nuclear age: foreign policy,
deterrence, defense, and dollars. Much of the
criticism and explanation of US defense
policies is misleading because different
definitions, of at least the first three elements,
are provided or assumed by the critics and
explainers.
For more than twenty years the principal
thrust of US foreign policy clearly has been
containment of Communist expansionism,
especially when it took the form of outright
aggression. Until very recently there was
consensus in the United States on the value

Presumably dollars need no definition and
their importance in the shaping of military
forces is obvious. Frequently, however,
discussions of national security policy
implicitly assume that resources (dollars) are
not a major constraint on available policy
o p t i o n s , o r conversely, t h a t fiscal
considerations are the principal parameters in
the formulation of security policy. Although
neither assumption is correct, one is based
upon a fundamental fact of life and the other
upon a generally accepted principal of
government. No matter how rich a nation is it
must face the fact that its resources are not
unlimited. On the other hand, as President
Nixon has pointed out, the most fundamental
task of government is t o provide security for
its citizens.3
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MASSIVE RETALIATION

That a veritable hornet's nest of criticism
followed Secretary of State Dulles' famous
"Massive Retaliation" speech should not have
come as a surprise. The speech addressed
foreign policy, deterrence, defense, and
dollars; and except for the policy of
containment, there was significant opposition
toward his views on each of those points.
Speaking to the Council on Foreign
Relations in January 1954, Dulles said that
only by reinforcing a local defense with the
"further deterrent of massive retaliatory
power. . ." could the Free World hope to
contain the spread of communism and,
therefore, the US Government had reached a
basic decision to ". . . depend primarily upon
a great capacity to retaliate. . . ." Moreover,
that basic decision would avoid ". . . grave
b u d g e t a r y , e c o n o m i c , and social
consequences."4
Although US security
policies and programs were not completely
static during the years following Dulles'
speech, the two assumptions and the basic
decision announced in the speech continued
to shape US security policy for the rest of the
Eisenhower Presidency. The assumptions were
that the landpower of the Communist World
enjoyed such superiority that no mere local
defense could be successful and, that if the

". . . T O
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John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State,
during the Eisenhower Administration.

Massive R e t a l i a t i o n focused on the
effectiveness of US nuclear might as an
instrument for shoring up the Free World's
local defenses. It was argued that the threat of
Massive Retaliation was of little value relative
to local defenses because it posed for the
American decisionmaker the choice between
employing nuclear weapons or acquiescing in
local Communist aggression. Moreover, since
the Soviets possessed nuclear weapons, the
stakes would have to be very high indeed
before the employment of nuclear weapons
could b e a rational choice. Dulles'
formulations. including his explanations
subsequent t o the famous speech, failed to
draw a clear distinction between deterrence
(discouraging the enemy from taking military
action) and defense (reducing costs and risks
in the event deterrence is not successful). It
was this failure which made valid most of the
critical analyses of the doctrine of Massive
Retaliation.5 Because it paid little attention
to the concept of the defense value of
military forces (their effect in mitigating the
adverse consequences of enemy moves) the

DEPEND PRIMARILY

UPON A GREAT CAPACITY TO
RETALIATE..

. ."
John Foster Dulles

United States attempted to maintain land
forces adequate to provide meaningful
reinforcement to the Free World's local
defenses, it would spend itself into
bankruptcy. The basic decision, of course,
was that by placing primary reliance upon its
capacity for nuclear attack, the United States
and its allies could deter Communist
aggression against the Free World's local
defenses.
The attacks on the strategic doctrine of
3

Retaliation. The danger of escalation to an
all-out nuclear war, once tactical nuclear
weapons were employed, made limited
tactical nuclear warfare almost as blunt an
instrument as "pure" Massive Retaliation. In
other words, because of the possibility of
escalation, a local defense based on the use of
tactical nuclear weapons included most of the
shortcomings of Massive Retaliation in terms
of its deterrent, defensive, and diplomatic
value.
In retrospect, it appears that the strategic
doctrine of Massive Retaliation was least
effective with respect to events in areas under
Communist hegemony and in areas where
there was no clear and direct confrontation of
US and Soviet power. In Western Europe, on
the other hand, Massive Retaliation was a
reasonably effective strategy. But there the
stakes always have been high; hence the
credibility of US willingness to accept the
consequences of a nuclear war with the Soviet
Union has been relatively great. Nonetheless,

doctrine lacked credibility and, hence, it had
little deterrent value against low level or
ambiguous threats to Free World security.
Further, the process of converting military
power into diplomatic power or influence is
always difficult, but especially so when
military power is concentrated in a form
which would be rationally usable only under
very high levels of provocation. In short, the
doctrine's lack of defense value severely
limited its applicability for local or limited
war.
Partly as a result of such criticism, the
Eisenhower Administration's security policies
shifted in the direction of an increased
emphasis upon a capability to fight limited
wars. However, any US involvement in such
conflicts was to depend heavily upon the use
of tactical nuclear weapons.6 Unfortunately,
since the Soviets introduced tactical nuclear
weapons into their force structure during the
1950s, this shift in American policy did not
negate the most basic criticism of Massive
4

to the Administration's security policies was
that both US strategy and force posture were
badly lacking in defense value and, therefore,
the United States was unable to deal
adequately with Communist initiatives.
But the important contribution of The
Uncertain Trumpet was its presentation of a
program intended to correct the deficiencies
of Massive Retaliation; a program Taylor
called "Flexible Response." He explained that
the label Flexible Response was intended to
suggest ". . . the need for a capability to react
across the entire spectrum of possible
challenge, for coping with anything from
general atomic war to infiltrations. . . ." He
justified the requirement for such a broad
capability on the basis that ". . . it is just as
necessary to deter or win quickly limited wars
as to deter general wars" lest limited wars
result ". . . in our piecemeal attrition or
involvement in an expanding conflict which
may grow into the general war we all want to
avoid."7

as the Soviet strategic nuclear capability
improved and expanded, the probable
consequences of such a war became
increasingly painful to contemplate.
THE PROLOGUE TO FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

In 1959 General Maxwell Taylor's book,
The Uncertain Trumpet, was published. It was
highly critical of the substance of US national
security policy, the force structure which was
intended to support the then current strategic
doctrine, and the decisionmaking methods
employed to arrive at strategies and force
levels. As an "insider," the former Army
Chief of Staff's arguments were read with
interest by those, both in and out of
government, who were opposed to the
Eisenhower Administration's security policies.
As a result, many of his views were further
aired in Congress and in the Presidential
campaign of 1960.
The principal thrust of Taylor's opposition
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An artillery gun crew firing against the Viet Cong.
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of Soviet submarine forces and for defense
against enemy submarines.9
It can be argued that Taylor's program
actually did not require any significant
alteration of the security policies which were
being pursued in the late 1950s. After all, his
proposals recognized the primary importance
of the strategic retaliatory forces; included a
requirement to retain a tactical nuclear
capability in the hands of the conventional
forces; and argued that all types of US forces
played i m p o r t a n t roles in deterring
Communist aggression. Because of its gradual
evolution, the doctrine of Massive Retaliation
already included all those elements. Since
those elements were included in the formula
of Massive Retaliation propounded in the late
1950s, the differences between Flexible
Response and Massive Retaliation were only
matters of degree-how large a force level
should be maintained and what should be the
level of combat readiness and deployability of
the conventional forces.
But that argument misses the central
differences between the two strategic
doctrines; it focuses on the two fundamental
elements where the doctrines converge and
slights the two elements where they diverge.
Both doctrines were designed to implement
the foreign policy of containment and both
place great importance on the concept of
deterrence. However, they differ widely with
respect to the importance they attach to the
concept of defense-the capability to fight in
a manner which will minimize damage and
loss, should deterrence fail. And, because of
that difference, they differ with regard to the
dollars (resources) which should be made
available for the nation's security forces.
These differences are sufficiently great that
they are not merely matters of degree, but
instead represent significantly different
philosophical approaches to the problem of
national security. The basic philosophy of
Flexible Response, with its emphasis on war
fighting capability and willingness to use that
capability in limited wars, is profoundly
different from the basic philosophy of
Massive Retaliation. Therefore, once adopted,
the strategy of Flexible Response would (and
did) lead to substantial changes in security

Explaining the broad outlines of his
program, Taylor unequivocably established
the tune he wanted to hear in place of the
previous "uncertain" sound of the "trumpet"
of US security policy:
The National Military Program of
Flexible Response should contain at the
outset an unqualified renunciation of
reliance on the strategy of Massive
Retaliation. It should be made clear that
the United States will prepare itself to
respond anywhere, anytime, with
weapons and forces appropriate to the
situation.8
Taylor's Program of Flexible Response
consisted essentially of five key elements.
First, modernize and protect the strategic
nuclear forces to insure that they could
survive a Soviet attack in sufficient strength

". . . TO

RESPOND ANYWHERE,

ANYTIME, WITH WEAPONS AND
FORCES APPROPRIATE TO THE
SITUATION."
General Maxwell D. Taylor

to inflict unacceptable levels of damage upon
the Soviet Union. Second, immediately begin
a major effort to revitalize the capability of
all three services to conduct warfare at levels
below general or all-out war and, though the
services should maintain their tactical nuclear
capabilities, principal emphasis should be
placed on their ability to fight with
conventional weapons. Third, establish a
strong and highly ready force of active duty
units in the continental United States as a
backup reserve force for both our deployed
forces and for our allies. Fourth, modernize
and increase the size of air and sealift forces
to provide a major capability for the rapid
deployment of the active duty forces in the
United States, and for resupply of all
c o m m i t t e d forces. F i f t h , develop
antisubmarine forces adequate for surveillance
6
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General Maxwell D. Taylor shown in 1964 with other dignitaries a t the representativesstand during the
National Shame Day Demonstration at Le-Loi Circle, Saigon, when General Taylor was Ambassador to Vietnam.
policy, defense budgets, and military force
posture.

embarked upon a program to remedy the
deficiencies of Massive Retaliation. With the
exception of strategic nuclear forces, the
McNamara changes in forces and strategy
were similar to those proposed in Taylor's
National Military Program of Flexible
Response.
V i r t u a l l y the first issue McNarnara
addressed was the adequacy and mix of the
strategic nuclear forces. Two fundamentally
different positions on the proper size and mix
of the strategic nuclear forces had developed
in the defense establishment which McNarnara
inherited. Both positions recognized that the
strategic forces must be able t o survive a
surprise attack in sufficient strength to
retaliate with a devastating blow, and both
stressed the requirement for effective
command and control to preclude an
accidental or unauthorized US attack. They
differed, however, with regard to their theory

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

Only when our arms are sufficient
beyond doubt can we be certain beyond
doubt that they will never be employed.
-President John F. Kennedy,
Inaugural Address 10
With those words, the new President
launched the United States upon a redirected
course in its security policy and a changed
emphasis in the structuring of its military
forces. Though the implied hope of avoiding
c o n f l i c t was doomed t o failure, the
President's intent to alter the nation's security
posture was clear. The new Secretary of
Defense, Robert S. McNamara, promptly
7

of targeting and the size and composition of
the forces required. One position, adopted by
Taylor in The Uncertain Trumpet and usually
identified as finite or minimum deterrence,
held that a relatively few well protected
weapons (perhaps 300 or 400 Polaris missiles)
aimed at Soviet cities would provide adequate
strategic nuclear deterrence. Its supporters
argued that such a force would slow down the
arms race; lessen the likelihood that the
Soviets would attempt a preemptive strike out
of fear of US forces; and would free dollars
for other uses. The other position called for
substantially larger forces, composed of a
mixture of delivery systems, and capable of a
variety of targeting options even after a Soviet
first strike. Usually labeled as the "war
fighting nuclear strategy," this position rested
upon two key premises: first, that even after a
Soviet strike the United States would retain
an interest in the nature of the postwar
situation; and second, that perhaps a
combination of avoiding enemy cities in the
initial US retaliatory attack, and retaining
nuclear forces in reserve would induce the
Soviets to limit their attacks t o military
targets. Although McNamara never fully
identified himself with this position, there is
little doubt that, at least in the early 1960s,
he generally accepted its arguments and
adopted its views on the general size, shape,
and targeting of nuclear forces.11
Secretary McNamara certainly flirted with
the idea of inducing the Soviets to adopt a
"no-cities" strategy. In a speech, probably
intended for the Kremlin as much as for the
Fellows of the American Bar Foundation to
whom it was formally addressed, he said:

. . .Our

forces can be used in several
different ways. We may have to retaliate
with a single massive attack. Or, we may
be able to use our retaliatory forces to
limit damage done to ourselves, and our
allies, by knocking out the enemy's bases
before he has had time to launch his
second salvos. We may seek to terminate
a war on favorable terms by using our
forces as a bargaining weapon-by
threatening further attack. In any case,
our large reserve of protected firepower
8

would give an enemy an incentive to
avoid our cities and to stop a war. Our
new policy gives us the flexibility to
choose among several operational plans,
but does not require that we make any
advance commitment with respect to
doctrine or targets. We shall be
committed only to a system that gives us
the ability to use our forces in a
controlled and deliberate way. . . .12
If those words were intended for the Soviets,
they appeared to fall on deaf ears. McNamara
waited in vain for any indication that the
Kremlin was prepared t o adopt a counterforce
or city-avoidance strategy. Probably as a
result, McNamara increasingly focused his
subsequent public discussions of strategic
nuclear matters o n the concepts of assured
d e s t r u c t i o n a n d damage l i m i t a t i o n .
Nonetheless, he never abandoned his
insistence that US strategic forces must
include a survivable and highly effective
command and control system, in order that
strategic weapons would remain a flexible
instrument of policy-capable of employment
in a manner appropriate to the situation.
Assured destruction simply means the
development and maintenance of strategic
nuclear forces and command and control
systems which can survive an enemy attack,
no matter how powerful, in sufficient
strength to retaliate at a level unacceptable to
the enemy. Such a capability clearly has
represented the strategic deterrent component
of US security policy from 1961 to the
present. But deterrence, even at the nuclear
end of the spectrum of violence, should not
be the sole component of a security policy.
Prudence dictates there also be a defense
component, in case deterrence should fail.
The label McNamara affixed t o the defense
component of US nuclear security policy was
damage limitation; defined as "the capability
to reduce the weight of the enemy attack by
both offensive and defensive measures and to
provide a degree of protection for the
p o p u l a t i o n against effects of nuclear
detonations."13 During the 1960s the relative
superiority of the US nuclear arsenal provided
a significant damage-limiting capability since

superiority. . . . But the blunt fact
remains that if we had had more accurate
information about planned Soviet
strategic forces, we simply would not
have needed to build as large a nuclear
arsenal as we have today.

the number of warheads available would have
permitted both counter-force as well as
counter-value targeting. However, little effort
w a s expended to improve the other
components of a meaningful damage-limiting
capability.14
A s i g n i f i c a n t portion of the sizable
increases in the early Kennedy defense
budgets was attributable t o spending on
nuclear delivery systems and warheads, in
order t o insure that the United States could
achieve and maintain an assured destruction
capability. 1 5
In later years, however,
McNamara said that the number of effective
warheads the United States possessed was
more than was required and contributed t o
the continuation of the arms race:

In strategic nuclear weaponry the arms
race involved a particular irony. Unlike
any other era in military history, today a
substantial numerical superiority of
weapons does not effectively translate
into political control, or diplomatic
leverage.16
In the final analysis, whether one uses
T a y l o r ' s proposals of 1958 or what
McNamara seemed t o be saying by the
mid-1960s, the basic philosophy of Flexible
Response toward strategic nuclear weapons is
that their possession in adequate numbers is
vital, yet they have little utility in terms of

. . . In the course of hedging against what
was then only a theoretically possible
Soviet buildup, we took decisions which
have resulted in our current

President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara
following a cabinet meeting at the White House.
9
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the politics, diplomacy, or the limited
nonnuclear conflicts of the modern world.
Once both sides have achieved an assured
d e s t r u c t i o n capability, the tools of
international adversary relations have to be
the traditional ones of diplomacy, power
politics or, at worst, limited armed conflicts;
any resort to strategic nuclear weapons would
be irrational.
The central elements of Flexible Response
have to do with the strategy of force
employment in conflicts short of all-out
thermonuclear war, and the force structure
necessary to conduct such conflicts. In The
Uncertain Trumpet, Taylor described Flexible
Response as the ability to react anywhere,
anytime-with forces appropriate to the
situation.17
McNamara, in Congressional
testimony said,

. . .Our

of 1961 surely must have served to convince
Kennedy and McNamara that their decision to
improve substantially the US capability for
warfare short of the strategic nuclear level was
correct.
By late 1961 it was apparent that the
United States was taking steps to provide
itself with a general purpose force structure
which could be employed according to the
precepts of the doctrine of Flexible
Response-particularly with regard to the
concept of defense. But it was precisely at
this point that the new Administration had to
face up to the inescapable constraint of
dollars. It is one thing to announce that a
capability to deal with aggression across the
entire spectrum of violence must be

". . . THE ABILITY TO RESPOND
PROMPTLY

limited war forces should be
properly equipped to deal with the entire
spectrum of. . . [limited aggression]; and
they should have the means to move
quickly wherever they may be needed on
very short notice. The ability to respond
promptly to limited aggressions, possibly
in more than one place at the same time,
can serve both to deter them and to
prevent them from spreading out into
larger conflicts.18

TO

.

LIMITED

AGGRESSIONS. . CAN

SERVE

BOTH T O DETER THEM AND TO
PREVENT

THEM

FROM

SPREADING OUT INTO LARGER
CONFLICTS."
Robert S. McNamara

The crises over Laos and Berlin, early in the
Kennedy Presidency, served to reinforce the
new emphasis on general purpose or
conventional forces, one in a negative, the
other in a positive fashion. The new
Administration had inherited a growing
governmental and insurgent crisis in Laos.
Investigation of the options available showed
that, because of the inadequacy of US
nonnuclear forces, no military action, short of
a wholly inappropriate resort to the use of
nuclear weapons, was feasible.19
Some
months later, the results of mobilizing part of
the reserves and of deploying additional
regular forces to Europe, in response to Soviet
threats against Berlin, strongly suggested the
very real deterrent value of the defense value
provided by ready and mobile general purpose
forces.20 Both the Laotian and Berlin crises
10

developed, and that its development must be
based on an objective determination of
requirements without regard to "arbitrary
budget ceilings." But, in a democratic system,
it is quite another thing to actually do it.
Without belaboring either the politics or the
management techniques of the McNamara era,
it should be noted that, regardless of the
strategic doctrine employed, hard decisions,
in terms of compromises and risk taking, had
to be made. Thus, the goal of a ready general
purpose force structure capable of fighting
major campaigns in two theaters of
operations, plus a smaller contingency
operation elsewhere, was never achieved.
Nonetheless, the defense value of US forces
was improved markedly with a concomitant
increase in the diplomatic and political power
of the United States in the world arena.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND US COMMITMENTS
AND INTERESTS ABROAD:
THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

Justification for the new emphasis on
general purpose forces seemed clear and easy
to defend in regard to the underdeveloped o r
emerging nations of the non-Communist
world. In January 1961, the Soviet Union
formally announced that not only "world
wars," but "local wars," because of the
danger of their escalation into "world war,"
should be avoided. However, "wars of
national liberation" were both "admissible"
and "inevitable" and, moreover, should be
supported by the Communist Powers.21
Using this Soviet pronouncement as a
backdrop for a major policy speech, Secretary
McNamara attempted to explain both the
nature of the threat posed by "wars of
national liberation," and how the United
States intended to counter it. By the use of
"wars of national liberation" the Soviets
h o p e d t o p r a c t i c e w h a t McNamara
characterized as the "salami slice technique,"
which would gradually, in piecemeal fashion,
erode the credibility of US resolve to defend
its interests and commitments in the
underdeveloped world, while reducing both
the non-Communist world's territory and its
w i l l t o resist f u r t h e r C o m m u n i s t
expansionism.
Over the years since the strategy of
Flexible Response was adopted, US resolve to
resist the so-called "salami slice technique"
was tested on the Indian subcontinent, in
Africa, the Middle East, the Western
Hemisphere, and most importantly, in
S o u t h e a s t Asia. Only the last two
cases- intervention in the Dominican
Republic and the Indochina War-involved the
commitment of US combat forces. In the
others, China's invasion of India, Communist
meddling in various African nations, and
Soviet penetration of Egypt and, to a lesser
extent, other Arab states, the US responses
involved a mixed bag of military assistance,
e c o n o m i c actions, diplomacy, and
demonstrations of force-with an equally
mixed bag of results.
The principal difficulties in assessing the
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President Eisenhower listening to Nikita S. Khrushchev,
Chairman o f the Council of Ministers o f the USSR,
in 1959.

US intervention in the Dominican Republic
lie in the field of foreign policy, not in the
realm of strategic doctrine. If the danger of an
imminent subversive Communist takeover of
t h e D o m i n i c a n Republic was gauged
correctly, and if the prevention of Communist
expansionism, particularly in the Western
Hemisphere, was a fundamental axiom of the
p o l i c y of containment, then the US
intervention must be judged a successful
demonstration of the efficacy of the doctrine
of Flexible Response. The rapid deployment
of an appropriate level of US forces had
indeed snuffed out a "brush fire," before it
became either a Communist victory or an
11

otherwise serious threat to the security of the
Western Hemisphere.
With respect to the war in Southeast Asia,
it can be argued that the strategic doctrine
was not properly executed; that the tactical
implementation of the strategy was hemmed
in by too many constraints on the use of the
military might available. Or, on altogether
different grounds, it can be argued that the
situation in Indochina involved neither a
sufficiently clear US commitment nor interest
t o r e q u i r e a r m e d intervention. Both
arguments touch upon a key aspect of
Flexible Response-the value o f defense. The
defense value of US and allied forces failed to
provide sufficient deterrent value to preclude
the continued escalation of the enemy's war
efforts in Indochina. And, once deterrence
fails, defense is what one does to reduce the
damage or deprivation which the enemy is
attempting to inflict-with the damage or
deprivation being measured in terms of
territory, population, dollars, blood, and
political power and influence. In those terms,
no matter what the outcome of the tragic
conflict, a sizable body of US opinion, both
public and official, is going to hold that the
levels of damage and deprivation caused by
US intervention in Vietnam far outweigh the
costs which the United States would have
incurred had we chosen not to defend South
Vietnam. In short, the final irony of the
Vietnam War may well be that the basic
concepts of the strategy of Flexible Response
will be rejected.
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE AND US COMMITMENTS
AND INTERESTS ABROAD: WESTERN EUROPE

A t Athens in early May 1962, Secretary
McNamara addressed a semiannual meeting of
NATO's foreign and defense ministers. He
attempted to explain the new trend of US
strategic thought as it applied to the NATO
region.22 The speech touched off a strategic
debate on the US role in the security of
Western Europe which was even then
smoldering, and is not yet ended.
In essence, McNamara told the assembled
minsters that the United States wanted to
extend the strategy of Flexible Response to
12

E u r o p e . T h e speech recognized that
ultimately the ground forces of NATO might
still function only as a trip wire to trigger a
massive retaliatory attack upon the Soviet
Union, but its principal theme was the
importance of developing military options,
short of a nuclear exchange, should NATO's
deterrent strategy fail:

. . . The

Alliance has over-all nuclear
strength adequate to any challenge
confronting it. . . . This strength not only
minimizes the likelihood of major nuclear
war, but it makes possible a strategy
designed to preserve the fabric of our
societies if war should occur. . . .
For the kinds of conflicts, both political
and military, most likely to arise in the
NATO area, our capabilities for response
must not be limited to nuclear weapons
alone.. . . In order to defend the
population of the NATO countries and to
meet our treaty obligations, we have put
in hand a series of measures to strengthen
our nonnuclear power. . . .
We expect that our allies will also

undertake to strengthen further their
nonnuclear forces, and to improve the
quality and staying power of these forces.
These achievements will complement our
deterrent strength. With improvements in
Alliance ground force strength and
staying power, improved nonnuclear air
capabilities, and better equipped and
trained reserve forces, we can be assured
that no deficiency exists in the NATO
defense of this vital region, and that no
aggression, small or large, can succeed.23
European arguments against the strategy of
Flexible Response fall into three basic
categories. The first is that any official
declarations or actions indicating the
adoption of the strategy (such as significantly
strengthening NATO ground forces) lessen the
deterrent value of the nuclear retaliatory
forces, by suggesting to the Soviets that a war
in Europe need not involve payment of the
ultimate price of an all-out nuclear exchange.

Under careful examination this argument
appears to have little substance; it clearly is
the weakest of the three. Almost any
alternative is better than an immediate resort
to a cataclysmic Armageddon. Moreover,
there is no reason to believe that the Soviets
would be emboldened by policies or actions
which suggest that NATO has increased its
capability and determination to defend
Western Europe.
The underlying premise of the first
argument is extended by the second. Usually
identified with the French, it holds that the
formal adoption of Flexible Response
accentuates nagging doubts about the
reliability of the US commitment to take the
final steps which would lead to a Soviet
attack on the US homeland. Fundamentally,
this argument shares the broader views of the
French military theorist, General Gallois, who
maintains that alliances have little value in the
nuclear era. No nation, he argues, would risk
annihilation for the sake of another.
Exceptionally grave consequences would flow
from a general acceptance of this line of
argument, not the least of which would be a
proliferation of national nuclear delivery
systems and, as a result, a serious
destabilization of the nuclear balance.24
The third argument is the most compelling.
It begins with the recognition that the initial
defense of Western Europe under Flexible
Response can take only two forms, either a
fully conventional defense or a defense based
on the use of tactical nuclear weapons. A
purely conventional defense almost certainly
would not be feasible at the "Iron Curtain."
It is possible that an adequate defense could
be established at the Rhine, but it is more
probable that it would be erected at the line
of the Somme, the Vosges, the Jura, and the
Alps. In the words of a former French Chief
of Staff,

Europeans that we are, as a method for
defending Europe.25

A tactical nuclear defense, which surely
would result in the use of Soviet tactical
nuclear weapons, is equally unacceptable to
the Europeans since, ". . . even a tactical
nuclear exchange would completely crush
Europe for 1800 miles from the Atlantic to
Soviet border."26 Finally, the likelihood of
tactical nuclear war, long remaining limited, is
very low; therefore the cost of developing a
capability for an adequate defense would be
wasted. In short, deterrence, not defense, is
perceived as the only acceptable approach to
the problem of serious Soviet aggression in
Western Europe.
From a European standpoint the security
of the NATO region begins and ends with
deterrence. A genuinely credible conventional
defense is rejected on the grounds that it is
nearly impossible to believe that the Soviets
would risk an attack without using at least
their tactical nuclear weapons. Moreover, even
if they failed to use tactical nuclear weapons,
an unacceptably large piece of European real
estate would, perhaps irretrievably, fall into
Soviet hands. A defense with tactical nuclear
weapons is even less appealing. For the
average European citizen, such a defense
would produce results little different from
those of an all-out nuclear war.
The United States maintains that a
reasonably credible capability for defense
provides two advantages. First, options short
of thermonuclear war offer at least the
possibility that Soviet aggression could be
checked. Second, and more important, the
greater the defense value of NATO's general
purpose forces, the greater the credibility of
NATO's overall deterrent posture.
Henry Kissinger provides an excellent
summation of the nature of the debate:

. . .The

This. . .would culminate in allowing the
aggressor to seize a part of Europe which
might not be recaptured for a long period
of time, or even recaptured at all if
conventional methods were held to. . . .
[It] does not seem satisfactory to us,

real problem is not that the
Europeans fail to understand our quest
for multiple options. They simply reject
it for themselves. When the issue is Asia
or Latin America, Europeans favor an
even more flexible response than we do;
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with respect to the defense of Europe,
their attitude is more rigid. . . . Europeans
prefer to force us to make our response as
automatic as possible. . . .
They have maintained that deterrence
depended on posing the most extreme
risks. They have been prepared to
sacrifice a measure of credibility in favor
of enhancing the magnitude of the threat.
This debate has been inconclusive because
it ultimately depends on a psychological,
not a technical judgment.27
FLEXIBLE RESPONSE I N PERSPECTIVE

Flexible Response places great emphasis on
defense, both as a means toward credible
deterrence, and as an end, when deterrence
fails. Therefore, the thrust of Flexible
Response is clearly in the direction of war
fighting. This means that high level
policy-makers are forced to consider, in
advance, the consequences of a failure in
deterrence; it does not mean that every time
deterrence fails the United States must choose
to defend. In those cases, over the last ten
years, where the United States has chosen to
defend, the decision to intervene was not a
knee-jerk response, blindly based upon a rigid
strategic doctrine. Rather, the decisions to
defend were based upon judgments as to the
relative costs which would be incurred, on the
one hand by defending, on the other hand by
refusing to defend. The judgments may have
been wise or tragically in error, but they have
nothing to do with the strategy of Flexible
Response.
O bviously, Flexible Response when
contrasted with Massive Retaliation is both a
more expensive strategic doctrine and, at least
philosophically, suggests a greater readiness to
commit forces in response to low levels of
provocation. After all, Massive Retaliation
and Flexible Response are different. Their
principal difference lies in the fact that
Flexible Response is based upon a more
accurate perception of what constitutes
credible deterrence and the options actually
available to the United States should
deterrence fail. In the 1950s, Massive

Retaliation was a strategy that failed to
consider adequately the value of defense; it
was overfocused on deterrence. It is quite
possible that Flexible Response, as actually
practiced in the 1960s, was overfocused on
intervention and thus contributed to failures
in properly assessing the defense value of the
employment of US forces in certain
situations. But if that is so, it simply
represents a failure in judgment; it doesn't
constitute a failure in the strategic doctrine.
Or, to put it another way, US commitments
and interests are not shaped by strategy;
s t r a t e g y is shaped by interests and
commitments. On the other hand, an inability
t o d e f e n d a threatened interest or
commitment because of an unwillingness to
devote the necessary resources toward ready
and reserve forces is not necessarily a failure
in either strategy or political judgment; it may
be simply a correct judgment as to the proper
ordering of national priorities.
Those who claim that the international
situation has evolved to a point where the
basic concepts of Flexible Response are no
longer valid are mistaken. In the future, as in
the past, the likelihood of total war is low,
while the likelihood of limited conflicts is
relatively high. Therefore, the United States
cannot expect to "preserve an external
environment conducive to relative stability
and security in the world" without an
adequate and credible capability for limited
war. This is not to deny that the world has
changed; obviously it has. Indeed, the
long-standing policy of containment is in a
state of transition and a reordering of national
priorities i s constricting the relative
availability of dollars for security forces. But
the underlying logic of the requirements for
defense as well as deterrence remains valid:
The external interests of democratic
powers are not necessarily identified with
the status quo in all respects, nor do they
require that the rest of the world be
democratic. Clearly, neither condition is
feasible. However, they do require that
the inevitable adjustments and
accomodations among governments and

people should be sufficiently moderate

and gradual to permit orderly change.
Long run interests as well as immediate
interests of democratic nations lie in
preserving an external environment
conducive to relative stability and
security in the world.28
Robert Osgood
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